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TAX NEWS
MARY LANIGAR, C.P.A., Beverly Hills, California
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
The frequency with which published 
court decisions have concerned family part­
nerships within recent months indicates 
that taxpayers resorted to the partnership 
device to reduce surtaxes during the war 
years to such an extent that even legitimate 
arrangements have resulted in litigation. 
The Lusthaus and Towers decisions of the 
Supreme Court held that for Federal in­
come tax purposes partnerships (including 
those recognized by state law) may be dis­
regarded if the evidence indicates that the 
arrangements were not genuine and did not 
result in a change in economic interest in 
the business. Based upon these decisions, 
LT. 3845 sets forth a Bureau policy of con­
sidering the peculiar facts of each case as 
evidenced by the terms of the agreement 
and the conduct of the parties. The fol­
lowing major criteria for determining the 
effectiveness of such arrangements for in­
come tax purposes were listed:
(1) The family member alleged to be a 
partner must render services in the regu­
lar conduct of the business to a degree and 
of a quality ordinarily expected from a 
partner in the type of business concerned.
(2) The partner must participate in the 
control and management of the business. 
Recent cases have ruled against the tax­
payer where the partners were minor chil­
dren or were limited in participation in 
management by the partnership agreement.
(3) The partner’s capital should origi­
nate with the contributor. In many family 
partnerships the wife’s capital is derived 
from a gift from the husband or from a 
loan to be repaid from profits. While these 
conditions alone do not determine that the 
partnership is not bona fide, they are evi­
dence unfavorable to the taxpayer. Con­
tribution of separate funds of the wife at 
a time when the business required addi­
tional cash and could not obtain it elsewhere 
would be evidence favoring the taxpayer.
(4) The last consideration is the reason­
ableness of the proportion of profits which 
a partner receives considered with respect 
to the value of the services rendered and 
the capital invested.
The numerous Tax Court decisions 
handed down in 1947 have not departed 
from these general principles, but some of 
these cases are of interest because of their 
particular factual situations. In the 
Schrecher case, to which the Commissioner 
has acquiesced, the partnership was not 
recognized for tax purposes and the wives’ 
partnership profits were withdrawn and 
invested in real estate which was rented to 
the partnership. The Tax Court held that 
the profits received by the wives but taxed 
to the husbands were the same as outright 
gifts to the wives, and that the rent from 
the real estate purchased with these profits 
was the separate income of the wives.
DEDUCTION FOR ACCRUED TAXES
In The Baltimore Transfer Co. case (8 
TC No. 1) the taxpayer computed and 
accrued its 1943 liability for Maryland 
unemployment compensation at a rate cor­
responding to a notice from a State Admin­
istrative Board. After the Federal income 
tax return had been filed and the State tax 
had been paid, the corporation was notified 
that its rate had been reduced and was 
credited with the overpayment. The Tax 
Court held that the total amount accrued 
was deductible in 1943. Under the tax bene­
fit rule a refund or credit received in the 
following year would be taxable if the de­
duction resulted in a tax benefit.
I.T. 3849 concerning accrual of New 
York franchise tax in 1945 follows the same 
line of reasoning as the case discussed 
above. The New York State franchise tax 
accrues on the first day of a corporation’s 
fiscal year. On March 12, 1946 the rate 
was reduced from 6% to 4.5% for taxable 
years ending after June 30, 1945. In the 
case of corporations using the accrual 
method of accounting, tax returns for fiscal 
years ended July 31, 1945 to November 30, 
1945 would presumably have been filed and 
franchise tax deductions at the 6% rate 
would have been claimed. A previous rul­
ing (I.T. 3813) held that such corporations 
should file amended Federal returns. I.T. 
3849 modifies I.T. 3813 and states that 
corporations accruing the deduction at the 
rate of 6% for years ended December 31, 
1945 and prior thereto will be allowed the 
New York State franchise tax deduction as 
claimed. The excess accrual (the difference 
between 6% and 4.5%) will be income in 
the following year.
The principle followed by both the Tax 
Court and this Bureau ruling is that deduc­
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tions for accrued State or local taxes which 
are based upon rates and other information 
available to taxpayer when closing its books 
should not be disturbed. Refunds due to 
retroactive changes in rates or subsequent 
rulings are income in a later year rather 
than adjustments of the accrued amounts.
TAXABLE STOCK RIGHTS
The U. S. Supreme Court has held that a 
distribution by a corporation to its share­
holders in its stock or in rights to acquire 
its stock does not constitute income if the 
proportionate interests of stockholders are 
not changed by the distribution. For ex­
ample, subscription warrants for second 
preferred stock distributed to common 
stockholders but not to first preferred stock­
holders would be taxable. Previous rulings 
have held that taxable stock rights consti­
tuted income when received and that the 
fair market value at the date received was 
the basis for computing gain or loss when 
rights were sold. A new ruling (G.C.M. 
25063) has held that no income is realized 
until the rights are sold. Several court 
cases are cited to support this interpreta­
tion. It further states that no deductible 
loss is sustained if rights are allowed to 
expire. Section 117 (g) (2) of the Code, 
which provides that gains or losses attribu­
table to the failure to exercise options to 
buy or sell property are to be considered as 
short term capital gains or losses, is dis­
tinguished as being applicable only when 
the option was acquired for a considera­
tion.
One of the principles set forth in G.C.M. 
25063 may result in considerable litigation. 
While several rulings are cited to support 
the opinion that the entire amount received 
upon the sale of taxable stock rights con­
stitutes ordinary income, this principle has 
not been generally accepted heretofore. The 
line of reasoning followed is that rights 
are in lieu of dividend income and therefore 
do not constitute capital gain.
REINVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS OF 
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION
To avoid undue hardship the Internal 
Revenue Code provides that gain from in­
voluntary conversion of property (destruc­
tion by fire or flood or seizure by condem­
nation) will not be recognized if the pro­
ceeds are reinvested in similar property. 
Such gains are recognized unless the tax­
payer elects to benefit under the involuntary 
conversion section of the law (Sec. 112(f)), 
and taxpayers who have so elected must 
comply fully with the regulations. These 
provisions deal only with gain as a loss is 
fully recognized in any event. The gain is 
the excess of the insurance proceeds or con­
demnation award over the adjusted basis 
of the property.
The law provides that the proceeds must 
be used forthwith to acquire similar prop­
erty. The use of the term “forthwith” in 
the statute implies that the replacement 
will be within a reasonable time under the 
circumstances. A number of court cases 
have arisen on the point of time for replace­
ment. If it is not practical to replace imme­
diately (because of priorities, for example), 
the taxpayer may establish a replacement 
fund with the approval of the Commis­
sioner. The regulations specify the form 
to be used to apply for establishment of a 
replacement fund and provide that a bond 
will be required if permission is obtained.
The property acquired with the proceeds 
of the involuntary conversion must be simi­
lar in use to the property seized or de­
stroyed. The regulations cite use of pro­
ceeds from requisition of tugs to buy bar­
ges and investment of proceeds from con­
demned unimproved land in improved real 
estate as examples of investments which 
are not similar in character. The property 
acquired assumes the same basis for tax 
purposes as the property destroyed. If a 
taxpayer elects to report $100,000 fire in­
surance proceeds from a building with a 
$50,000 basis as an involuntary conversion, 
the second building acquired for $100,000 
will also have a basis of $50,000. If he 
purchases a replacement for $90,000, gain 
of $10,000 will be recognized.
The regulations state that it is not suffi­
cient for a taxpayer to show that subse­
quent to the receipt of money from a con­
demnation award he has purchased other 
similar property. The taxpayer is required 
to trace the proceeds of the award into the 
payments for the second property. This 
provision was very strictly interpreted in 
the Kennebec Box and Lumber Co. case 
(Memo TC). This taxpayer deposited all of 
its fire insurance proceeds in a special bank 
account. Before replacing the destroyed 
property, the corporation withdrew ap­
proximately $50,000 from this account 
which it later replaced. The new property 
was acquired from funds in the special bank 
account (which then equaled the insurance 
proceeds), but the court ruled that gain was 
recognized because the amount of $50,000 
(which had been withdrawn temporarily) 
was not insurance proceeds invested in new 
property.
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